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ABSTRACT
Internet-wide scanning depends on a notion of liveness: does a tar-
get IP address respond to a probe packet? However, the interpreta-
tion of such responses, or lack of them, is nuanced and depends on
multiple factors, including: how we probed, how different proto-
cols in the network stack interact, the presence of filtering policies
near the target, and temporal churn in IP responsiveness. Although
often neglected, these factors can significantly affect the results of
active measurement studies. We develop a taxonomy of liveness
which we employ to develop a method to perform concurrent IPv4
scans using ICMP, five TCP-based, and two UDP-based protocols,
comprehensively capturing all responses to our probes, including
negative and cross-layer responses. Leveraging our methodology,
we present a systematic analysis of liveness and how it manifests in
active scanning campaigns, yielding practical insights and method-
ological improvements for the design and the execution of active
Internet measurement studies.
CCS Concepts
•Networks→ Signaling protocols; Transport protocols; Appli-
cation layer protocols; Network dynamics; Cross-layer proto-
cols;
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Internet-wide scanning has emerged as a key measurement tech-
nique to study a diverse set of the Internet’s properties, including
address space utilization [6, 17], host reachability [5], topology [7,
37, 19], service availability [21, 22], vulnerabilities [12, 18, 25],
and service discrimination [20]. In simplest terms, active scanning
campaigns involve the sending of one or more probe packets to
a target IP address and observing a response (or absence thereof)
from the targeted host. If a host replies to a probe packet, we refer
to it as alive. Individual measurement campaigns (see above) are
typically crafted to elucidate individual properties of the Internet
and its host population. Yet despite the widespread use of active
scanning and its critical importance for Internet measurement, we
still lack a systematic framework that allows us to understand IP
liveness and, more importantly, how it manifests in the form of
host replies to active probing. What type of probe packets should
we send if we, for example, want to maximize the responding host
population? What type of responses can we expect and which fac-
tors determine such responses? What degree of consistency can we
expect when probing the same host with different probe packets?
Fundamentally, liveness is not a straightforward binary matter,
but varies depending on: (i) probe type and the target or target
network’s policies related to firewalling and filtering, (ii) temporal
churn due to targets going up and down, and (iii) protocol inter-
dependencies that result in probes to one target eliciting responses
from another (e.g., ICMP Error responses to TCP probes). While
seemingly nuanced, such characteristics have the potential to sig-
nificantly affect the result of active measurement campaigns. We
argue that developing a systematic understanding of these issues
yields methodological improvements and practical implications for
active measurements at large. Towards achieving this goal, we
make the following contributions in this paper.
First, we propose a taxonomy of liveness, examining what it
means to say that a target IP address is alive and how liveness can
be inferred considering responses to active probing (§2). This tax-
onomy develops our understanding of liveness at different layers,
and covers responses across protocols and from non-targets (e.g.,
middleboxes). Informed by our taxonomy, we introduce a method-
ology for performing Internet-wide scans concurrently across a
set of different protocols at various layers, including ICMP, pop-
ular TCP services and popular UDP services (§3). Our diverse
set of probe packets allows us to study the responsiveness or non-
responsiveness of individual host populations to specific protocols.
Our scans are comprehensive in that we capture all replies to our
probe packets, including negative (e.g., TCP Rst packets) as well
as cross-layer replies (e.g., ICMP error replies). This enables us
to uncover host populations otherwise invisible, as well as to study
cross-layer protocol interactions. Based on our gathered data, we
present an in-depth view of liveness, slicing our analysis along two
dimensions: (i) probe type (i.e., what type of packet we send), and
(ii) reply (i.e., what kind of response we receive?).
Our analysis yields important insights for both the design of ac-
tive scanning campaigns as well as the interpretation of scanning
results. Our key findings include: (i) TCP and UDP probes in-
crease the population responsive over ICMP by 18%, (ii) compre-
hensively capturing reply traffic (i.e., taking into account negative
reply packets) increases the responsive population by more than
13%, (iii) TCP stacks do not consistently respond with a TCP Rst
for non-available services—in our measurements only 24% of hosts
with an active TCP stack respond to all the probes, (iv) our concur-
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Figure 1: Flow chart showing liveness inference. We consider liveness at different layers based on responses to our probes.
rent scans allow us to identify nearly 2M tarpits that would bias
measurements that do not take them into account, and (v) we report
on the correlation of responsiveness across protocols uncovering
potential filtering practices.
We believe that our measurements paint the most comprehensive
and least noisy picture of the state of Internet liveness available to
date. Our taxonomy of IP liveness can serve as a basis for design-
ing and executing future measurement studies, particularly when
it comes to decisions such as what type of probe packets should
be employed and what type of responses should be captured, how
to interpret responses, as well as whether it is appropriate to use
the output of one scan as input for subsequent measurements. We
release the code and data of this work as open source to facilitate
replicability of the results, and to enable further research.
2. TAXONOMIZING IP LIVENESS
To systematize our understanding of IP liveness and its inference
using active probing, we introduce the following terminology.
Network-layer liveness. An IP address is network-layer alive if
it responds to a probe with an IP packet. This is the most basic
liveness criterion.
Transport-layer liveness. An IP address is considered transport-
layer active if it is capable of sending TCP packets (whether
SynAck or Rst) from at least one port. An IP address is transport-
layer alive if the transport protocol stack of the IP address is oper-
ational, sending packets with transport layer semantics.
Application-layer liveness. Application-layer active means that
the IP address sends a payload, valid or invalid, for at least one
application protocol. An IP address is application-layer alive if it
speaks the probed application protocol.
Figure 1 shows a flowchart of our methodology for inferring live-
ness, which depends both on the probe type and the reply (per our
taxonomy above). Observe that probes of different types have vary-
ing degrees of specificity (e.g., a TCP Syn probe targets a specific
port number, whereas an ICMP Echo probe targets a vanilla IP
address), as well as different inference power (e.g., ICMP Echo
requests can only infer network layer liveness, while TCP probes
can infer transport layer liveness in addition). The dependency on
probe type is important to realize, as different probes can reveal
different views of liveness at a given layer. For example, our UDP
probes contain application-specific requests, but the corresponding
responses can indicate network- or application-layer liveness. In
this context, negative replies (i.e., ICMP error messages of type
Port Unreachable) indicate network-layer aliveness.
In the remainder of this work, we employ this taxonomy to ana-
lyze liveness through active probing scans. We focus our analysis
on network and transport layers, but include application layer live-
ness in the taxonomy for completeness.
3. SCANNING IP LIVENESS
In this section, we discuss our experimental setup, and scanning
methodology and considerations. We focus on intra-scan liveness,
that is how the visible IP population varies when considering differ-
ent probe types and captured responses across the same scan cam-
paign. Characterization of long-term temporal churn (i.e., the birth
and death of responsive IP addresses) and diurnal behaviour, as
well as spatial churn (i.e., difference in responses due to diverse
scan locations) is outside the scope of this work.
Overview. We collect data from simultaneous scans covering 8
protocols performed on September 5, 2017. For validation, we per-
formed the same scans also on 4th and 7th September, finding con-
sistent results. We target the entire IPv4 address space, less a black-
list covering 14.7% of the total IPv4 address space. The blacklist
includes private and reserved space (covering 14% of IPv4) and
users opting out of measurements (0.7% of IPv4 at the time of mea-
surement). The entire scan takes less than 24 hours to complete and
generates 2.3 TB of data. We select ports that run well-documented
applications, and cover both the server as well as (at least partially)
the client space. We restrict the analysis to eight concurrent scans
for feasibility. We perform one network layer ICMP Echo scan, five
transport layer TCP Syn scans covering popular ports 22 (SSH), 23
(Telnet), 80 (HTTP), 443 (HTTPS), and 7547 (CPE WAN Man-
agement Protocol, CWMP [4]) and two popular UDP-based appli-
cations, DNS and NTP.
Tools. We use ZMap [40] for the network, transport, and UDP-
based application layer scans. ZMap uses raw sockets, crafting
ICMP Echo, TCP Syn and UDP packets embedded directly into
Ethernet frames. In contrast to earlier studies using ZMap, we
tightly synchronize simultaneous scans of several protocols; that
is, we probe each IP address for all of our protocols within a short
time window, to minimize the effect of temporal churn. Moreover,
we customize ZMap so as to capture any reply to our probes includ-
ing negative responses such as ICMP errors and TCP Rsts. We use
SiLK [38] for scan data analysis. We convert all IP sets of inter-
est to SiLK IPset data structure that uses a compressed binary tree
structure to store IPs. We mainly use relevant SiLK tools (such as
rwsettool) to perform fast set operations on this data.
Cross-protocol scans. Internet liveness legitimately changes over
time due to temporal churn, for example hosts going up and down
and dynamic IP address assignment. To minimize the effect of tem-
poral churn, we probe each IP address for all of our protocols within
a short time window. To do so, we partition the IPv4 space into /3
blocks, and configure parallel scans to probe IPs in the same or-
der by using the same seed value for the ZMap address generator
within each block. This block-scanning strategy provides an op-
portunity to synchronize at the start of each new block. We quan-
tify the resulting lag by recording the timestamp of every millionth
packet sent by ZMap to measure the maximum time between dif-
ferent protocol probes sent to the same target. While it can be up
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to 25 minutes, over 80% of probes are sent to the target within a
10 minute window.
Reply capture completeness. To provide a comprehensive picture
of liveness across different layers, we must capture all replies to our
probe packets, not just those expected for a successful response.
However, by default ZMap does not record ICMP error messages
for TCP scans, and only records ICMP PortUnreachable for UDP.
We modified ZMap to capture all ICMP error messages in response
to our probes. We link these error responses back to the probe
that generated them by checking the header of the original packet,
included in the payload of the error-response packets. Since stock
ZMap only records TCP Rst packets with the Ack bit set (as others
fail ZMap’s validation checks for a deterministic Ack number), we
also modified it to record all TCP Rst packets.
Packet loss mitigation. Executing multiple concurrent scans on
shared hardware increases the risk of packet loss, at the host and
due to transient network problems. To minimize in-network loss,
we probe redundantly. Since network losses often occur in bursts,
we modify ZMap to perform delayed retransmissions. We make
ZMap store each IP address it scans for the first time in a queue of
size N . When the queue is full, ZMap begins de-queuing and re-
transmitting, interleaving with new probes. The delay between the
original and retransmitted probes depends on the size of the queue
and ZMap’s packet-sending rate. We use N = 1M and a scan rate
of 100kpps, giving a delay of 20 seconds. Our probe redundancy
increases the population of active IP addreses (per ICMP) by 2.2%.
We determine this by running two ZMap instances (with no retrans-
mission) in parallel, with a delay of 1 minute between them; for
retransmission hit-rate, we aggregate responsive IPs across both,
while for hit-rate of single-packet transmission, we only consider
the first one of these scans. Furthermore, we employ additional
pcap filters in ZMap and adjust host buffer sizes to avoid local
packet loss when running multiple ZMap instances on the same
host. We inspected scan monitoring logs to confirm that no scans
experienced drops at the NIC or in pcap.
Another parameter that can affect our inference of liveness is the
connection timeout value: how long to wait for a reply before con-
sidering the probed IP as unresponsive. ZMap is stateless and does
not need a timeout value, but this is an important consideration for
the application-layer scanner ZGrab. Padmanabhan et al. recom-
mend a conservative timeout value of 60 seconds [26]. However,
using a high timeout value is not feasible for our application-layer
scan which grows prohibitively resource-intensive. We therefore
use the default value of 10 seconds. This can potentially lead us to
flag some IPs (especially those in cellular networks) as unrespon-
sive, as their responses are slow to arrive [26].
4. CHARACTERIZING IP LIVENESS
We next analyze our scan data to answer a number of practical
questions on how the probe type and the corresponding responses
affect the view of liveness at the network and transport layers.
4.1 Network Layer Liveness
Overall, our scans recorded 487M network alive IPs (IPall) out
of 3.6B probed.
What is the coverage of different probe types?
Reachability, performance, and topology studies often employ
ICMP Echo and traceroute to scan the Internet for network alive-
ness. Here, we investigate the effect of the probe type on the mea-
sured network alive population: Figure 2a shows the coverage of
IPall over different scans by protocol. Overlapping IPs poten-
tially respond over multiple probe types while unique IPs respond
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Figure 2: Network layer aliveness inferred by scan types.
to only one probe type. As others have found [17, 22, 23, 5], we
see that ICMP Echo probes are most effective in discovering net-
work active IPs, revealing 79% of IPall, followed by TCP probes.
UDP probes, however, illuminate a very restrictive view. Further
we find that 16% of IPall can only exclusively be discovered via
TCP, and a small but significant ≈ 2% can only be discovered via
UDP probes. The high percentage of exclusive coverage from TCP
is somewhat surprising, suggesting widespread filtering/firewalling
of ICMP traffic within networks and at target hosts. A number of
studies measure network aliveness at the granularity of /24 address
blocks [14, 7, 37, 19]. Figure 2b shows the aliveness breakdown
for /24 blocks, where we find that the effect of the probe type is
much less pronounced. The set of /24 blocks discovered by indi-
vidual probes is far more uniform in its coverage of /24all (the set
of all discovered /24s). Surprisingly, our TCP scans show the high-
est coverage, discovering some 5M active /24 blocks, slightly more
(≈ 3%) than ICMP Echo.
What is the coverage of different probe responses?
A probe can trigger multiple types of responses, for example
TCP Syn can trigger TCP SynAck, TCP Rst, or ICMP Error re-
sponses. Interpretation of network aliveness depends on what re-
sponses are captured. In the previous analysis, we aggregated all
replies per scan, for example an ICMP response to a TCP Syn probe
counted the same as a SynAck. Figure 3a decomposes scan replies
to characterize their contribution to the overall scan coverage of
IPall. ICMP Echo is dominated by ICMP EchoReply as we would
expect. However, ICMP Error responses comprise a sizable portion
of TCP, and are the dominant means of inferring network aliveness
via UDP. We find that 2.3% of IPall is discoverable only through
ICMP Error responses, with ICMP probes lighting up 20% of such
IPs, TCP probes some 76%, and UDP probes 35%. This might be
due to routers and middleboxes that are configured to ignore direct
probes but indirectly reveal activity via ICMP Error packets [16],
as well as due to filtering and firewalling in networks and end hosts.
What do ICMP error responses reveal?
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Figure 3: Breakdown of responses to scan types.
ICMP Error messages, even though often neglected, not only
increase the visible population of network alive IP addresses, but
can also reveal characteristics of the target host and network. In
Figure 3b, we break down ICMP Error into four categories: (i)
ICMP PortUnreachable is a type-3 (Destination unreachable) mes-
sage typically generated by end hosts when a port is not active,
(ii) ICMP HostUnreachable is a type-3 message sent by gateway
devices (e.g., routers) when the host is unreachable, (iii) ICMP
OtherUnreachable represents all other type-3 messages sent by
gateway devices when the destination is unreachable (e.g., protocol
unreachable [29]), and (iv) ICMP Other represents the remaining
three ICMP Error packets (ICMP TimeExceeded, ICMP Redirect,
and ICMP SourceQuench) that we observed in our data. We con-
sider the source IP of any of the above packets as network alive
even when it is generated by an IP other than the one we probed.
Our TCP and UDP scans generate the majority of ICMP Por-
tUnreachable messages, typically generated directly by the end
host. Indeed, it is expected behavior (RFC 1122) that hosts gen-
erate such messages if no service is a available on a given port
number. However, our scans also resulted in a large number of
ICMP Error messages that were generated by intermediate devices
on the path towards the target. Majority of such messages are in-
dicative of network misconfigurations, or firewalling. The latter
is very prominent: among the ICMP OtherUnreachable messages
for TCP and UDP, we find that code 13 “Communication admin-
istratively prohibited” dominates (representing about 80% of such
messages), and about 15% of ICMP OtherUnreachable messages
correspond to code 0 “Destination network unreachable” and code
10 “Host administratively prohibited”. In future work, we plan to
inspect ICMP messages more closely to reason about firewalling.
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Figure 4: Transport layer liveness.
4.2 Transport Layer Liveness
Recall that we measure transport layer liveness by conducting
TCP SYN scans on five different ports. In total, we find 262M
transport active IPs (i.e., those responding to TCP Syn with a
TCP Rst or TCP SynAck) representing 53.8% of IPall.
How does the probed port affect the responsive population?
If hosts responded consistently across TCP ports, we would ex-
pect to see the same number of transport active IPs across all
five scans since an IP would respond with either TCP SynAck or
TCP Rst for each probe, in accordance with RFC standards. We
find, however, that the number of active hosts varies vastly when
probed on different port numbers. Figure 4a breaks down trans-
port active IPs into 5 classes: IPs that responded only on one probed
port, IPs that responded on exactly 2 ports, and so forth. We also
show whether the responses were TCP SynAck, TCP Rst, or both,
per class. Only 24% of active hosts respond to probe packets on
all five ports. This, in turn, shows that the vast majority of hosts
selectively suppress responses for particular application protocols,
due to firewalling and/or filtering. Their visibility or non-visibility
in active scanning campaigns heavily depends on the choice of port
numbers to probe. We next look at the coverage of the 262M TCP
active IP address population by probe type (Figure 4b). HTTPS
is the most active port number, with 180M IPs, surprisingly fol-
lowed closely by CWMP with 159M IPs. We find that the HTTP
port is surprisingly less active than the HTTPS port, and the Telnet
port shows the least activity of all the probed protocols. Each of
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the probed ports contributes a unique set of otherwise unresponsive
hosts: some 11.5% of all TCP activity can exclusively be found by
probing the CWMP port. SSH, HTTP, and HTTPS provide unique
coverage of 3–6% of active IPs, while the exclusive coverage of
Telnet is low (0.8%).
What is the coverage by probe response type?
As introduced in our taxonomy (§2), we make a distinction be-
tween transport layer activity and aliveness per RFC 793: TCP
stacks should respond to TCP Syn probes with a TCP SynAck if a
service is listening on the probed port, or TCP Rst otherwise [30].
We term the subset of transport active population that responds
with a TCP SynAck as ‘TCP alive’, indicating a service is running
on that port. Figure 4b shows that except for HTTP, for a given
protocol, the TCP alive population is vastly smaller than the TCP
active population on that port. Hence, negative replies (TCP Rst)
are crucial for capturing the population of TCP active hosts com-
prehensively. We also find surprising results regarding the TCP
alive (i.e., replying with a TCP SynAck) population: the size of the
of CWMP alive population is surprisingly large, and as a point of
comparison, it is greater than the SSH alive population. CWMP
provides means for remote management of end-user devices such
as modems, routers, gateways, set-top boxes, and VoIP-phones [8].
A possible explanation could be related to widespread distribution
of CWMP-speaking CPE devices by ISPs.
How do fabricated responses affect the measured population?
One consideration in enumerating the TCP alive population of
any given protocol are network tarpits: IPs masquerading as fake
hosts, responding positively to all TCP Syn probes [2]. We dis-
covered 1.9M transport alive IPs that appear in all TCP scans. To
confirm that these are tarpits, we scanned these IPs on a random
high port six days after the original scan—89% responded pos-
itively, strengthening our belief that these are tarpits. (Further
analysis of the identified potential tarpits would require studying
the application-layer behaviour—or absence thereof—of the con-
cerned hosts, which we will undertake in future work.) If, as is
common practice, transport alive IPs are taken as a proxy for the
service population (e.g., IPs that respond to TCP Syn probe on port
80 with SynAck represent Web servers), then the 1.9M tarpit IPs in-
flate HTTP, HTTPS, and CWMP footprints by 3–4% of their orig-
inal size, SSH by 10% and Telnet as high as 23%. To mitigate bias
due to tarpits in studies conducting transport-layer measurements
from which to make application-layer inferences, simultaneously
probing a high random port number for liveness can aid in identi-
fying such instances.
4.3 Cross-protocol Liveness
In this section, we investigate what fraction of a given proto-
col’s responses are also captured by other protocols. Understanding
these interdependencies is vital for designing multi-stage scanning
campaigns, as well as for understanding consistency in filtering
behavior across protocols. Figure 5 shows the conditional prob-
abilities for activity (which includes both positive and negative re-
sponses) of our probed TCP- and UDP-based protocols. For ICMP,
we consider network-layer aliveness (i.e., IPs that respond with
ICMP EchoReply). We make several observations: the bottom-
most row shows that a significant fraction of transport active hosts
(26% on average for TCP services and 12% for UDP) cannot be
discovered via ICMP. Ths is an important consideration, given that
it is common practice to use the subset of ICMP-alive IP addresses
for further scans, e.g., to measure service availability. Correlation
across TCP and UDP protocols is generally lower when contrasted
to protocols within each family. Secondly, the TCP and UDP blocks
indicate varying degrees of correlation in filtering behavior across
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Figure 5: Conditional activity per probe type. (For ICMP, we con-
sider network-layer aliveness.)
services, when seen pair-wise. On one hand, we find consistent fil-
tering practices: for example, a Telnet-active host is very likely to
elicit a response from both SSH and HTTPS. Put another way, if a
given host is active for Telnet, then with high probability (>=0.9),
it is active per SSH and HTTPS. On the other hand, for CWMP
only 56% of active hosts respond on HTTP, indicating an under-
lying filtering pattern of the CWMP-active population. We plan to
investigate cross-protocol filtering practices in more depth in future
work.
5. RELATEDWORK
Measurement of Internet liveness has received considerable at-
tention in contexts including network topology, performance and
reachability [17, 32, 37, 24, 36, 7, 24], outages [33, 32], service
characterization [27, 21, 31], security vulnerability tracking [12,
18, 25], and service discrimination [20]. Measurement has used
passive vantage points [9, 10, 34], active probing [22, 13, 17], and
both in combination [3]. We focus here on inference of liveness
via active probing. Internet-wide scanning has historically taken
significant time and resources. Early work limited its scope to
BGP prefixes [39, 22, 37], though subsequent work demonstrated
the inadequacy of control-plane data to measure data-plane con-
ditions [5, 35]. Another way to limit the scope of active prob-
ing is to use “hitlists” to target active probes. Early hitlists com-
prised IP addresses selected from various passive sources [28, 19].
Later work shifted towards more informed random selection of tar-
get IP addresses offering greater coverage and higher likelihood
of liveness [7, 15], and using Internet censuses to derive respon-
sive, complete, and stable hitlists [14]. Heidemann et al. pro-
vided a breakthrough in the area of active probing by conduct-
ing a full IPv4 scan over 2–3 months in 2007 [17]. IRLScanner
scans the advertised IPv4 address space, obtained from a Route-
Views BGP dump and the local border router, in approximately 24
hours [22]. The Shadowserver Foundation [1] regularly conducts
scans of the entire Internet for security vulnerabilities in popular
protocols. Recently, ZMap [13] and its application layer counter-
part ZGrab [11] dramatically reduced the time to complete a full
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IPv4 scan to a few hours. These tools operate on commodity hard-
ware, and data from regular Internet scans using these tools is made
publicly available at scans.io. These data enabled a large num-
ber of follow-on Internet-wide security-modeling and performance
studies. All these studies discuss practical considerations in active
probing, such as temporal churn, the types of probes, firewalls, and
the scanning tool itself triggering blocking.
Our work adds to this rich body of literature by systematically
examining how liveness manifests over different protocols and
across layers with active probing, the factors affecting these views,
and how they are correlated.
6. CONCLUSION
Liveness—whether or not a target IP address responds to a probe
packet—is a nuanced concept without a simple yes/no answer. Re-
sponsiveness directly depends on the probe type, the configuration
of the targeted host, as well as on firewalling and filtering behav-
iors at the edge or within networks. The interpretation of responses
(positive, negative, absent) in turn allows for drawing conclusions
about liveness on different layers. Towards the goal of system-
atically understanding these issues, we presented a taxonomy of
liveness that encapsulates the inherent dependencies between dif-
ferent protocols and layers. We developed and evaluated a method-
ology for performing concurrent Internet-wide scans across mul-
tiple protocols, comprehensively capturing positive, negative, and
cross-layer responses to our probes. We find that responsive host
populations are highly sensitive to the choice of probe: while ICMP
discovers the highest number of raw IPs, our TCP and UDP mea-
surements exclusively contribute a fifth to the total population of re-
sponsive hosts. Collecting ICMP Error messages for TCP and UDP
scans significantly improves coverage and provides new opportuni-
ties to interpret scan results. At the transport layer, our concurrent
measurements reveal that the majority of hosts exhibit inconsistent
behavior when probed on different ports and that capturing nega-
tive responses significantly improves scanning completeness. Our
study of cross-protocol liveness shows that, while responsiveness
for protocols is correlated, using the result of one scan to bootstrap
another should be taken with care, since every probe type intro-
duces an individual bias.
In the future, we plan to deepen our understanding of active scan-
ning in multiple dimensions, looking at: (i) liveness at the appli-
cation layer, (ii) how liveness varies over time and IP space, and
(iii) the multivariate probability distributions of transport layer live-
ness, and exploring using existing results and their correlations to
reduce scan traffic.
Source code and data release The source code of our modifica-
tions to ZMap, scripts to run block-wise scans, and analysis can
be found at https://github.com/sheharbano/scan_liveness (and also
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1209947). Data created during this
research is available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1068899.
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